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Several modern accounts of explanation acknowledge the importance of
abstraction and idealization for our explanatory practice. However, once
we allow a role for abstraction, questions remain. I ask whether the rela-
tion between explanations at different theoretical levels should be thought of
wholly in terms of abstraction, and argue that changes of variable between
theories can lead to novel explanations that are not merely abstractions of
some more detailed picture. I use the example of phase transitions as de-
scribed by statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to illustrate this, and
to demonstrate some details of the relationship between abstraction, ideal-
ization, and novel explanation.
Introduction
... if you are not ‘hipped’ on the idea that the explanation must be
at the level of the ultimate constituents... there is a very simple ex-
planation here. The explanation is that the board is rigid, the peg is
rigid, and as a matter of geometrical fact, the round hole is smaller
than the peg, the square hole is bigger than the cross-section of the
peg. (Hilary Putnam [22, p.94])
The idea that higher level theories can be more explanatory of some phenom-
ena than lower level ones is a appealing one. In some ways, it is obviously right;
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to describe, say, a biological phenomenon in terms of molecular dynamics (or,
God forbid, quantum field theory) is to lose all hope of understanding in a morass
of detail. And yet, until quite recently, the idea was not properly fleshed out in
the literature on scientific explanation; causal, deductive-nomological and unifi-
cationist models all appeared to imply that more detail, or a more fundamental
theory would always lead to better explanations.
The last few years have seen more attention paid to the importance of abstrac-
tion and idealization to explanation. Michael Strevens’ book, Depth [25] suggests
a central role for abstraction in causal explanations. In the philosophy of physics
literature, Robert Batterman [3, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8] has drawn attention to a host of cases
in which different theories are connected by limiting relations, and argued that
related phenomena cannot be explained using only the resources of the more fun-
damental theory. In doing this, Batterman goes further than merely arguing for a
role for abstraction, and argues that there is a sense in which fundamental theories
may be regarded as explanatorily inadequate.
In this paper, I also want to go a step beyond merely noting the importance
of abstraction for explanation (although my account will differ significantly from
Batterman’s). I will examine the possibility of novel explanation. Putnam’s fa-
mous example, which considers the explanation of a square peg’s failure to fit into
a round hole, seems to be a case in which more than one explanation of a phe-
nomenon is possible. On the one hand, we have a common sense explanation in
terms of rigidity and geometry, and on the other we have (or rather, don’t have, but
are aware of in theory), an explanation in terms of the microscopic constituents
of the peg and hole. Suppose we grant that, even if we were in possession of
the microscopic account, the macroscopic account would provide a better expla-
nation. And suppose we also grant that abstraction is an important part of the
explanatory story, that the throwing out of detail often leads to better explana-
tions. We might then ask whether abstraction is the whole story: can we account
for the explanatory utility of the higher level explanation purely by noting that it
is a distant abstraction of the more fundamental explanation? Should we model
all explanations as situated along a sliding scale of abstraction, with higher level
explanations deriving their considerable explanatory power from their ability to
concisely summarize relevant information from some fundamental picture?
I will argue here that abstraction is not the whole story. When we change from
one theory to another, the change of variables involved can induce novel expla-
nation. However, abstraction is an important part of the story here; it is precisely
because the abstraction that we deem appropriate is highly sensitive to changes
in variables that the explanations given by one theory may be deemed novel with
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respect to another theory. When we properly understand the role of abstraction,
we appreciate that explanatory value may be irreducible, even where theoretical
reduction is possible. Particular kinds of complex variable change make the ab-
straction techniques of the higher level theory opaque from the perspective of the
lower level theory.
Although the account I give here has the potential to be applied quite widely,
I will work through a detailed example that has been much discussed in the phi-
losophy of physics literature, that of phase transitions. Phase transitions require
an appeal to an asymptotic limit for their explanation within statistical mechanics
(in this case the thermodynamic limit, which involves taking the particle number
parameter to infinity). Along with other cases of asymptotic inter-theoretic re-
lations, phase transitions have sometimes been held to be emergent phenomena,
where emergence can mean something quite weak; a common theme is that emer-
gence involves novelty or autonomy. But emergence is a weasel word, and nov-
elty and autonomy are often left undefined. This paper gives an account in which
the explanatory value of one theoretical description may not always be reducible
to the explanatory value of another, and argues that variable changes involving
asymptotic limits can play a role in this irreducibility of explanatory value. It may
therefore be construed as giving an account of emergence in terms of explanatory
novelty, and as explaining why asymptotic limits can lead to cases of emergence.
However, if this is an account of emergence, it is a very weak one. The examples
I will discuss are all cases in which reduction is possible in quite a strong sense.
As such, I add my voice to a number of physicists [1] and philosophers of physics
[10, 11] who believe that theories can be novel despite being successfully reduced
to another theory. But the reader who is allergic to the term emergence, or who
believes it to be by definition incompatible with reduction, may pass over any
emergence talk in this paper. What is really of interest here is the sense in which
higher level explanations may be novel.
I begin in section one by giving a toy example that illustrates the interplay be-
tween abstraction and changes of variable in a very simple context. The example
illustrates the way in which changes of variable can lead to changes in explanatory
abstraction, and thus lead to judgments of explanatory value at one level that cut
across those at another. However, this example is too simple to illustrate the case
convincingly, first because the kind of change of variable involved is too simple,
and second because the variable change fails to lead to an interesting theory. This
motivates the need to wade into the deeper waters of real physics.
In section two, I introduce a more realistic and contentious example, that of
phase transitions. I argue that the puzzles surrounding phase transitions can be
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solved. However, they provide a realistic and interesting example of the com-
plexities involved in real variable changes, which typically a subtle interplay of
idealization and abstraction. Phase transitions are also of interest because they’ve
been held by some authors to involve emergence. I argue that, when the puzzles
surrounding phase transitions are solved, no obvious novelty remains. However,
examination of the phase transition case indicates the existence of a particularly
irreversible change of variables between statistical mechanics and thermodynam-
ics.
Section three follows on from the discussion phase transition by taking a
broader look at the issues of idealization and abstraction raised.
In section four, I return to the relationship between thermodynamics and sta-
tistical mechanics, and argue that the value of certain kinds of thermodynamic
explanation is not explicable from the perspective of statistical mechanics. The
abstractions used in thermodynamic explanation are not readily available in statis-
tical mechanics, precisely because of the complex nature of the variable changes
involved in moving between the two theories. The kinds of considerations in-
volved in the case of phase transitions therefore do introduce novelty of a sort, but
in a more indirect way than is sometimes suggested.
This paper touches on vast topics, and there is much that will go undiscussed.
My account of phase transitions will be only a sketch, in part because I think the
topic has been well-discussed elsewhere, and in part because I hope that the results
here are of interest to a general audience that a technical discussion of statistical
mechanics might exclude.
Moreover, although this is a paper on explanation, I will not recommend a
model of explanation, nor will I give a full-bodied account of the circumstances
under which some abbreviation of a detailed description counts as an explana-
tory abstraction. I will however assume that abstraction should be part of our
account of explanation itself, and not merely of our account of the pragmatics of
explanation. In assuming this, I deny the picture of explanation painted by Peter
Railton [23], in which our theory of explanation (deductive-nomological, causal,
or whatever) defines the ideal explanatory text, which we then select from based
on context. Rather, I hold there to be cases in which abstraction leads to better
explanation in a robust sense, not merely because of an audience’s limited capac-
ity for absorbing detail, but because some details are of much greater explanatory
relevance than others, or because the feature to be explained is the robustness of
some feature under changes of detail.1 This is the kind of account articulated by
1The contrast between a view on which the value of abstraction is a matter of pragmatics and
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Figure 1: The spinning ball
Michael Strevens for causal explanation, and it is my hope that something like this
can be developed for those cases of explanation that are not covered by the causal
account.
1 Abstraction and changes of variable: A toy exam-
ple
The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the kinds of variable changes
involved in moving from one theory to another can lead to explanatory novelty.
Real examples of this will, however, be complex enough that the phenomenon at
issue is hard to spot. It’s therefore helpful to begin with a very simple example of
a change of variables, and consider what happens in this toy model.
Consider a Newtonian model of a spinning ball, moving with constant velocity
in the x direction, as shown in Figure 1. If no forces act on the ball, the equations
governing its motion are very straightforward; if we point out that both angular
the one assumed here might be thought of as a contrast between epistemic and metaphysical senses
of explanatory value. In the kind of account of abstraction I assume here, abstraction is valuable
not only beacuse of our limited capacity for detail, but because it also allows us to track real
relevance relations in the world. I take it to be a matter of metaphysics that certain coarse-grained
variables are well-correlated with other coarse-grained variables. This more-than-epistemic view
of abstraction will feed into a more-than-epistemic view of explanatory novelty. I’ll have more to
say about this in the concluding section of this paper.
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and linear momentum are conserved, there is not much more to be said:
L = l (1)
p = k (2)
where L and p are angular and linear momentum respectively, and l and k are
constants. If at time t0 = 0 the ball begins at position x = 0 and angle of rotation
θ = 0, for constant momentum the equations of motion are:
L
I
t = θ (3)
p
m
t = x (4)
where I is moment of inertia and m is mass. If we are now asked to explain
the position of the ball at a given time, it’s obvious that angular momentum is an
irrelevant variable. A good explanation should only appeal to linear momentum
and equation (4). We have here a simple case of explanatory abstraction; a full
description of the set-up is less explanatory than a simpler account that includes
only the relevant detail.
However, consider an equally accurate mathematical description of the set-up
in terms of changed variables:
A = pm+ L (5)
B = pm− L (6)
The new equations relevant to explaining the position of the ball are:
A = a (7)
B = b (8)
A+B
2m2
t = x (9)
Equation (9) is dimensionally correct, and even appeals to the same ‘observ-
able’ quantities, (m, x and t) as equation (4). But in our transformed variables we
can no longer eliminate a variable and perform the abstraction. Any explanation
of the position of the ball will appeal to two different variables with the dimension
of angular momentum.
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What can this toy example teach us? It demonstrates that one common kind
of abstraction, variable reduction, is highly sensitive to a change of variables.
Although equations (4) and (9) are equivalent, (9) is not, by the lights of its vari-
ables, an explanatory abstraction, whereas (4) is. Part of what is valuable about
the explanation is lost in the variable change.
However, the example is too simple to make the point completely. After all,
faced with equation (9), a reverse change of variables almost jumps off the page;
the simpler explanation in terms of one variable is only a small algebraic step
away. But now suppose we are dealing with the kinds of variable change involved
in real inter-theoretic relations; these kinds of changes will be much more com-
plex; the backwards move is unlikely to be obvious. In fact, equations governing
variable change will rarely involve anything as simple as an algebraic relationship.
Typically, they will include ‘irreversible’ mathematical processes like summation;
information will be lost, and a change back to the old variables will not be possible
without prior knowledge of the previous theory. In general, once we have kicked
away the ladder that lead to our variable change, the way back to the original
theory and its abstraction techniques will not be reconstructible.
The toy theory is also misleading in another way; there is an obvious sense
in which the transformed variables of (7)-(9) are the wrong variables in which to
describe basic mechanics. The example would be more telling, and more inter-
esting, if our new variables themselves lead to successful abstraction techniques.
Although that’s not the case here, this will be the case when a change of variables
takes us from some more basic theory to a higher level theory, that is, when the
change of variables expresses a reductive relationship. Typically, the higher level
phenomenological theory is developed independently of, and often prior to, the
more fundamental theory. Its variables have been designed to lead to successful
abstraction by its own lights, and it will thus have its own standards of explanatory
value.
Given all of this, it is not at all clear why we should expect judgements of ex-
planatory value to map neatly from one theoretical level to another. What counts
as a good explanation in a given theory is often a matter of finding an explanation
in as few relevant variables as possible. However, this kind of variable elimination
itself depends on the choice of variables. Even when neat reductive relations are
possible, the move between theories will involve a move to new variables and new
judgements of explanatory value. An abstraction that leads to a good explanation
in the higher level theory may ‘cut across’ the division between variables naturally
made within the more fundamental theory. Even though the higher level descrip-
tion may be reduced to, and understood in terms of, the lower level description, the
7
lower level will not agree with the higher level as to whether the description con-
stitutes a good explanation; from the more fundamental perspective, the selection
of information may look hopelessly arbitrary.
It is in this sense that the explanations offered by higher level theories may be
novel with respect to some more fundamental theory. Changes of variable induce
changes in explanatory abstraction, and these lead to explanations that are not
merely abstractions from the description provided by the underlying theory. The
case for this will be made stronger by a real example, where two different theories
both have considerable explanatory pedigree, and where the relationship between
them is particularly complex.
2 Phase Transitions
To get a better handle on how real changes of variable work, I’ll look at the re-
lationship between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. This is far from a
simple topic; the degree to which thermodynamics is reducible to statistical me-
chanics is a matter of some debate, and individual instances of reduction are gen-
erally controversial. Nonetheless, the reduction of thermodynamics (henceforth
TD) to statistical mechanics (henceforth SM) is more complete than most; we
have reasonable statistical mechanical definitions of a number of thermodynamic
variables.
To get at one such change of variable, and the complexities involved in it, I’ll
spend some time discussing phase transitions. Phase transitions include changes
of state, such as water boiling or carbon dioxide sublimating, as well as some
less familiar phenomena, like sudden changes of magnetization. These all have in
common that they involve sudden changes to the large scale physical properties of
a system (‘sudden’ here means corresponding to some very small change in some
control variable). Thermodynamics proves adequate to describe and categorise a
wide variety of these effects via a discontinuity in a variable of the thermodynamic
theory.
I will here describe only the first-order phase transition associated with a
change of state of some system held at a stable temperature away from critical
temperature (at or near certain temperatures, the behaviour of certain systems be-
comes particularly odd), but much of what is said here applies to other phase
transitions as well. Even in our simple case, we will see that a puzzle arises: ther-
modynamics characterises phase transitions as involving a discontinuity in the free
energy of a system. However, the statistical mechanical function corresponding to
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the free energy of the system can only possess discontinuities if we take the limit
of the function as the number of particles becomes infinite. It therefore seems, at
first blush, as if statistical mechanics predicts that phase transitions can only occur
in infinite systems.
Before describing the problem, and how to begin to solve it, in a little more
detail, it’s worth defending my choice of example. There is an ongoing and lively
debate about the status of phase transitions; why choose such a contested example
of inter-theory relations with which to make a general point about explanation?
Oddly, this is actually one of the more straightforward examples available within
the range of SM/TD boundary problems.2 The problems here have been well
treated and (in my view) solved within the existing literature. This solution can
even be stated with relative brevity, making my job a good deal easier. Phase tran-
sitions involve asymptotic limits, and have therefore been held by several differ-
ent philosophers to be cases in which interesting novelty arises. Discussing phase
transitions will give me the opportunity to analyse the importance of asymptotic
limits.3 My eventual claim will be that asymptotic limits lead to particularly robust
and interesting changes of variable, and thus to novel explanations.
2.1 First order phase transitions at constant temperature: a
sketch
For a simple example of a phase transition,4 let us take a system at constant tem-
perature, whose volume is changed slowly enough that the system stays close to
equilibrium at all times. Thermodynamics predicts that such a system will un-
dergo a phase transition when there is a non-analyticity in the free energy of the
system; that is, when the free energy of the system or one of its derivatives un-
dergoes a discontinuous change. Figure 1 shows the predicted thermodynamic
behaviour of a system in terms of its Helmholtz free energy (A, here given as
ATD to make it clear that this is a thermodynamic quantity) and pressure (P ) plot-
2This will raise eyebrows among readers familiar with the philosophy of physics literature.
There is a great deal more to be said about phase transitions than will be touched on here. For
example, I will not discuss the strangely universal behaviour shared by diverse systems when at or
near critical temperature, nor the renormalization group techniques used to explain this behaviour.
However, the issues here can be divorced from these interesting questions for our purposes. For
recent more physics oriented treatments see [20],[12] or [21].
3In [11] Jeremy Butterfield discusses a range of such cases.
4Even for this simple example, what I give here is only the barest of sketches. For a detailed
treatment see e.g. [24].
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Figure 2: Helmholtz free energy A at a constant (less than critical) temperature.
From [24].
ted against volume. The Helmholtz free energy here is defined in terms of the
thermodynamic variables U (internal energy), T (temperature) and S (entropy):
ATD = U − TS (10)
When we move to a statistical mechanical description of the same phenomenon,
we give the Helmholtz free energy in terms of SM variables:
ASM = −kBT lnZ (11)








Z is obtained by summing over all microstates with some particular energy Er,
and will depend on the number of particles in the system.
Now, it’s clear that by having both a thermodynamic and a statistical mechan-
ical expression for the free energy, we ought thereby to have an expression for
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the thermodynamic free energy in statistical mechanical terms. That is, we should
have a bridge law that reflects the change in variables involved in moving from
SM to TD. However, things are not this simple: Problems arise when we note that
Z is a sum of analytic functions, and is hence itself an analytic function. This
also makes A analytic (an analytic function of an analytic function is analytic).
And an analytic function is infinitely differentiable; it cannot have the kind of
discontinuities in its derivatives shown in figure 1.
However, we can find a way round the problem if we take the thermodynamic
limit, that is, if we examine the behaviour ofZ asN →∞, whereN is the number
of particles. In this limit Z can indeed have appropriate singularities. So in order
to recreate the predicted thermodynamic behaviour in statistical mechanics, we




2.2 Locating and dissolving the mystery
Real systems are finite. It is therefore puzzling that we should have to appeal to
an infinite limit in order to account for phase transitions.5
In [13], Craig Callender states the puzzle as arising due to a tension between
four propositions:
1. Real systems have finite N.
2. Real systems display phase transitions.
3. Phase transitions occur when the partition function has a singu-
larity.
4. Phase transitions are governed/described by classical or quan-
tum statistical mechanics (through Z).
[13, p.549]
At least one of these propositions must be given up, and all four options have
been explored in the literature. (Philosophical opinions, like gases, tend to expand
to fill all corners of a given space.) But of particular interest here is the possibility
of denying 4, and declaring phase transitions irreducible in one sense or another.
This is the approach Batterman takes when he writes:
5The very abbreviated account below roughly follows that given in Paul Mainwood’s work
[17, 18]. For a detailed account in the same vein see Jeremy Butterfield and Nazim Bouatta [12].
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My contention is that thermodynamics is correct to characterize phase
transitions as real physical discontinuities and it is correct to represent
them mathematically as singularities. Further, without the thermody-
namic limit, statistical mechanics would completely fail to capture a
genuine feature of the world. Without the thermodynamic limit, in
fact, statistical mechanics is incapable even of establishing the exis-
tence of distinct phases of systems. [5, p.12]6
Given the statistical mechanical model, it is not clear why we should insist that
phase transitions must be ‘real physical discontinuities’. Certainly, no amount of
data will establish a discontinuity, and it’s hardly obvious that we witness discon-
tinuous behaviour when we see water boil. Of course, data can’t establish the lack
of a singularity either. Batterman claims that to assume that there is no physical
discontinuity is to beg the question - to assume the completeness of statistical me-
chanics when that is precisely what is at issue. However, unless we have bought
wholesale into Batterman’s anti-foundationalism, it seems very odd to think that
we are not allowed to privilege the mathematical form of a more fundamental
theory over one that is approximate and phenomenological.
Callender’s suggestion is that we deny 3, and insist that phase transitions do
occur even when there isn’t a singularity. Instead, we can simply insist that:
3*. Phase transitions occur when the partition function is such that there would
be a singularity in the thermodynamic limit.
With this definition, the tension between Callender’s four propositions vanishes.
This solution seems roughly right, but all our work is not quite done. It is
important to get clear on the role that thermodynamics is playing on our puzzle.
Mainwood argues that the puzzle can be generated without any reference to ther-
modynamics whatsoever; it is in fact a problem internal to statistical mechanics.
It turns out that even if we consider the problem of modeling phase transitions
within statistical mechanics, in complete ignorance of the thermodynamic treat-
ment, the infinite limit is unavoidable. For one thing, the finite N case is computa-
tionally intractable. When we move to the infinite case, we render the problem of
predicting phase transitions easier in part because we abstract away from bound-
ary conditions. By ignoring the complex interaction of water molecules with the
sides of the kettle, and eliminating details such as the shape of the kettle itself, we
allow for generalised predictions of the phenomenon of water boiling.
6Chiang Liu [15, 16] also shares something like this view.
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It is an assumption of this paper that such abstraction methods are not a mere
matter of mathematical convenience, that abstracting from detail can lead to an
increase in explanatory power; we have here an example that illustrates this. In
this case, the increase in explanatory power is quite pronounced, for it is only
when we take the thermodynamic limit that mathematical structures emerge that
allow us to distinguish between various phase transitions of different types. This
categorization and characterization of different phase transitions is a key success
of statistical mechanics. That the N →∞ limit is crucial to this success makes it
apparent that the pressure to understand the theory’s reference to the infinite case
comes from within statistical mechanics itself.
With this awareness, and our replacement proposition 3* in hand, the puzzle
begins to look more benign. What we appear to have is a case of a rather extreme
idealization7 required for the modeling and explanation of phase transitions in sta-
tistical mechanics. This idealization allows for a successful abstraction technique,
which enhances the explanatory power of the theory.
As Mainwood points out, the problem is now one of justification: how do we
know that by taking the thermodynamic limit, we abstract in such as way as to
reveal structural features of the actual (non-infinite) system? To some degree, this
idealization is justified by its own predictive and explanatory success, but more
justification is desirable. In particular, it would be nice to have better mathematical
models which would allow us to more fully understand the relationship between
the finite N case and the thermodynamic limit. But this is not a deep conceptual
worry of the kind that the problem is sometimes taken to imply. Moreover, we do
at least seem to have the beginnings of such models for simple systems. Butter-
field and Bouatta [11, 12] have argued that we can see asymptotic behaviour as
emerging before the limit in various cases. In the case of simple non-critical phase
transitions, a model called the Ising model is relevant; this demonstrates simple
phase transitions for finite two-dimensional magnetic systems. Of course, the sys-
tems we have been discussing are neither magnetic nor two-dimensional, but there
is reason to think that similar results apply to the phase transition under discussion
here. If we see models like the Ising model not as providing adequate alternative
predictions, but rather as justifying the use of the infinite limit, then they have
considerable explanatory power. They lend plausibility to the idea that taking the
7John Norton argues in [21] that taking the thermodynamics limit involves approximation
rather than idealization, but I’ll continue to refer to the phenomenon under issue here as idealiza-
tion. Although the difference between idealization and approximation is conceptually important,
nothing in my discussion here turns on which of these categories the use of the thermodynamic
limit falls under.
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thermodynamic limit picks out features of the actual finite partition function.
This brief discussion raises a number of issues concerning the nature of ab-
straction and its relation to idealization; these will be the topic of the next section.
However, before moving on, it’s worth returning to the issue of novelty. One rea-
son for our interest in phase transitions was that they were held to involve novel
behaviour. Bob Batterman thinks phase transitions involve novelty in rather a
strong sense; they involve physical singularities that are ‘not there’ in the finite
statistical mechanical description. However, if we want to resist this (and the
above discussion seems to suggest that resistance is far from futile), one might
wonder whether all novelty is thereby dissolved. Jeremy Butterfield doesn’t think
so:
I take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some
comparison class. I take reduction as, essentially, deduction. The
main idea of my first rebuttal will be to perform the deduction after
taking a limit of some parameter. Thus ... we can deduce a novel and
robust behaviour, by taking the limit N →∞ of a parameter N.
But on the other hand, this does not show that the N → ∞ limit is
physically real, as some authors have alleged. For my second main
claim is that in these same examples, there is a weaker, yet still vivid,
novel and robust behaviour that occurs before we get to the limit, i.e.
for finite N. And it is this weaker behaviour which is physically real.
[11, p.1065]
However, now the problem is that, once one has demonstrated that a given
behaviour is to be expected even in the finite case, the obvious sense of novelty
proposed by Batterman is no longer available. What then, do we mean when
we say that phase transitions exhibit novelty? My answer here (which will be
explained in detail in section 4) is that, qua part of thermodynamics, phase transi-
tions exhibit explanatory novelty, where explanatory novelty is to be cashed out in
the terms suggested in section one. I make no claim that this captures Butterfield’s
meaning in the above, nor that this explanatory novelty is the only kind of novelty
to be found in phase transitions, but it at least provides one way of thinking about
novelty in this reductive context.
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3 A tangled web: abstraction, idealization and ro-
bustness
I am interested here in the change of variable that takes place when we express the
thermodynamic free energy in terms of the statistical mechanical partition func-
tion. Considering phase transitions demonstrates that this change of variables is
far from simple, and thus introduces a number of complications that were brushed
under the carpet by the toy example of section 1. It’s therefore worth making a
few distinctions, and exploring the relationship between abstraction and explana-
tion, and other concepts like idealization and robustness. One distinction, between
idealization (or approximation) on the one hand, and abstraction on the other, is
particularly relevant here:
• Abstraction: The elimination or omission of detail (often the omission of
variables).
• Idealization (and approximation): The introduction of strictly false state-
ments (either via the introduction of a model (idealization), or by making
false assumptions about the target system (approximation)).8
This distinction mirrors one made by Martin Jones [14], as well as by Ernest
McMullin [19].9 Because the above often go hand in hand, it is easy to lose
sight of the distinction, but a little attention to the toy example of section one will
demonstrate that not all cases of abstraction need involve idealization: in that case
angular momentum was genuinely irrelevant to the linear trajectory of the ball,
and thus one could abstract away from a full, detailed description of the system
without any need for false assumptions. Likewise, taking, say, the mean kinetic
energy of a system involves abstracting away from a great many details without
necessarily introducing any idealization.
However, my interest here is as much in the relationship between the two
concepts above as in their distinction. In the phase transition case, we have an
idealization involving the introduction of a false statement: that the particle num-
ber is infinite. This idealization allows us to abstract away from various details
8Again, the difference between idealization and approximation can be of great importance, but
I’ll here use the term ‘idealization’ as a proxy for both.
9The terminology here is as tangled as the web itself, and I don’t pretend that the terms I use are
defined uniformly throughout the literature. McMullin discusses the difference between Galilean
idealization and Aristotelian idealization, but the distinction is similar to the one above.
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including the boundary conditions. Thus, in this case, idealization facilitates an
explanatory abstraction.
An oft-used example can illustrate this neatly. Consider any inclined plane
calculation that neglects friction, by modeling the phenomenon on a frictionless
plane. Merely setting the frictional force to zero isn’t abstraction; the frictionless
plane may have zero friction, but the equations for friction can still be expressed,
however trivially. Abstraction comes after the idealization, when we omit friction
and its associated equations from our explanation of the motion of the body down
the inclined plane. Idealization here acts as a precursor to abstraction. In real-life
examples of explanatory abstraction idealization will often have a role to play in
facilitating the relevant abstractions.
Let us turn now to this question of justification. In order to facilitate explana-
tory abstraction, idealizations must be justified. That is, it must be shown that
the false assumptions made do not significantly impact on the features of the tar-
get system that are of interest. This is where a new concept, robustness, enters
the picture. If a feature of a system is robust, this means that it is stable under
perturbations of some other variables. In the phase transition example, in order
to justify our use of N → ∞, we need to show that the features revealed in this
limit reflect features of the finiteN system. We demonstrate this by demonstrating
that the features revealed in the thermodynamic limit are robust: they are invari-
ant under changes of N and under changes of the boundary conditions(as long as
N is large enough). The N → ∞ idealisation is justified just if the number of
particles and shape of a kettle are irrelevant to phase transition behaviour. Ro-
bustness demonstrations are of course often difficult and very involved, even for
well-understood cases; a great deal of work in both physics and philosophy can
be seen as attempting to provide such demonstrations.10
Thus the picture we have in the case of phase transitions is one of an idealiza-
tion that allows us to abstract away from detail. The idealization, and hence the
abstraction, require justification via some kind of robustness demonstration; we
possess some tools, such as the Ising model, for providing such a demonstration.
What of explanation? In the case above, the abstraction is required within statis-
tical mechanics for the explanation of phase transitions; even if we could solve
the many-body problem for some particular system required to predict a phase
transition, we wouldn’t have revealed the kinds of broad structural features gen-
10Butterfield’s well worked out examples in [11] can be seen as offering robustness demonstra-
tions (among other arguments). Several of Batterman’s examples also offer this kind of demon-
stration: see in particular his account of the rainbow in [5].
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erally associated with phase transitions. I take it this scenario is quite typical: the
full story within a given theoretical framework will often involve a combination
of idealization and abstraction. The elimination of a variable will often only be
possible if an effect is assumed to be small, or if a system is thought to be well
idealized by some simpler system. As we eliminate detail in this way, we will
often acquire better explanations; structural features of the theory once obscured
by detail will become clear, and problems become more tractable.
However, nothing I’ve said here speaks to explanatory novelty. The above
seems simply to be a case of abstraction. If this were all there was to our story
about explanation, the answer to my question - Can we account for the explana-
tory utility of the higher level explanation purely by noting that it is a distant
abstraction of the more fundamental explanation? - would be a straightforward
yes. But, as the toy example of section one suggests, things are not so simple
once a change of variable is involved. So far our discussion has stayed within
the realms of statistical mechanics and explanatory novelty has not yet raised its
head. I propose that explanatory novelty does emerge once we look at the move
to thermodynamic variables.
4 Novel explanation in thermodynamics
Let us return to the relationship between thermodynamics and statistical mechan-
ics. The last section told a complex story about the explanation of phase transi-
tions within statistical mechanics. I’ll argue here that the right view of this story
leads to a picture of the relationship between statistical mechanics and thermo-
dynamics that allows for explanatory novelty. One of the lessons we learn from
considering phase transitions is that at least one of the variable changes involved
in the bridge laws between the two theories is of a particularly complex and irre-
versible form. This change of variables itself involves abstraction. Novelty enters
the picture when we consider an additional set of abstractions: those required
when we explain things at the thermodynamic level. I’ll concentrate here on the
importance, within thermodynamics, of abstractions based on the work/heat dis-
tinction, and argue that they demonstrate explanatory novelty in the sense under




Our discussion above emphasised the description of phase transitions within sta-
tistical mechanics; they could be defined entirely via considering Z, the partition
function. If this analysis is right, where does thermodynamics enter the picture?
The answer is, rather late, only at the point at which we actually make the theo-
retical identification:
ATD = −kBT lnZ∞ (13)
Here the subscript in Z∞ is intended to indicate that this does not connect the
thermodynamic free energy ATD directly to the realistic, finite SM partition func-
tion, but rather expresses the free energy as a function of the idealized Z in the
thermodynamic limit. I take it that this is at least a potential bridge law11 link-
ing statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, and, as such, represents a change
from SM to TD variables. It’s the bridge law we need if ATD (which does have
non-analyticities) is to be strictly equal to some function of statistical mechanical
variables.
Nonetheless, there are problems with this identification, at least if it is sup-
posed to hold for all systems: many systems don’t possess a well-defined thermo-
dynamic limit! There are several approaches one might take to this. One option is
to deny that (13) ever gives the correct bridge law, and perhaps insist that the real
bridge law is only an approximate one:
ATD ≈ ASM = −kBT lnZ (14)
Filling in this notion of approximate equivalence will, however, be difficult,
and some might question whether a law like (14) has any place in a successful
reduction. Another option is to insist that (13) only applies to systems with a
well-defined thermodynamic limit, and hope that an alternative expression can be
found for systems without one. The full bridge law would then be disjunctive,
but I’ll assume here that, if such an approach were successful, this very benign
(and explicable!) disjunction needn’t undermine the reductive project. However,
I won’t try to solve this problem here. The fact that the thermodynamic limit
isn’t well defined for many systems is an ongoing research problem in statistical
mechanics; after all, without the thermodynamic limit, we have great difficulty
11In as much as I discuss reduction here, I have in mind a loosely Nagelian model of reduction
as the deduction of one theory from another with the aid of (potentially quite substantive) bridge
laws.
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in describing phase transitions. Moreover, I don’t intend to argue for the reduc-
tion of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, merely to investigate a kind of
explanatory novelty that might hold even if such a reduction succeeded.
With that in mind, let’s consider what kind of change of variable (13) is, and
what it might tell us about the relationship between statistical mechanics and ther-
modynamics if it were a correct bridge law. As a result of the appeal to Z∞, this
bridge law involves a mathematically irreversible operation; there is no way to
derive the actual statistical mechanical partition function from the infinite ideal-
ization. This is a simple consequence of the fact that taking the thermodynamic
limit involves the elimination of detail. Wherever a change of variables itself in-
volves abstraction, a backwards move to our old variables will be impossible. As
such, the kind of variable change expressed by (13) is very different from that
expressed by (5) and (6), our momentum variable changes in the toy example.
What if (13) turns out not to be the correct bridge law, but some other is avail-
able? It seems fair to say that any variable change that can capture the fact that
ATD genuinely does have non-analyticities will also share this feature of irre-
versibility; any way of fleshing out the ‘approximately equals’ relationship will
have to take into account the fact that ASM is a more fine-grained quantity than
ATD, because it depends on features of the partition function washed out by the
thermodynamic description. So even if (13) proves not to be the correct bridge
law, we can expect a bridge law that is mathematically irreversible.
4.2 Work and heat in thermodynamics
Do our new variables play a role in explanatory abstractions whose value can’t be
understood from the perspective of statistical mechanics? The answer seems to
be yes. Consider the following rather mundane question, and its answer within
thermodynamics: Why do diesel engines, unlike petrol engines, not need spark
plugs?
We answer this by considering the adiabatic compression of the gaseous air/fuel
mixture in the combustion chamber. As we compress the gas the temperature rises







where Ti/f is the initial/final temperature, Vi/f is the initial/final temperature, and
γ is the adiabatic index or heat capacity ratio of the gas, which measures the ratio
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of its heat capacity at constant pressure to its heat capacity at constant tempera-
ture. We then note that the autoignition temperature of diesel is lower than that
of petrol (210°C for diesel vs. 246-280°C for petrol). As a result, it possible
to reach diesel’s, but not petrol’s, autoignition temperature with realistic engine
compression ratios.
This example might be chosen almost at random from some vast list of ther-
modynamic explanations, for it displays a feature that’s exceedingly common: it
assumes that the process in question is adiabatic. Adiabatic processes are those
that involve no heat transfer between the system and its environment; all energy
transferred is transferred as work. If a process is fast or particularly well-insulated
this is a reasonable assumption, and it’s very widely used, especially in explana-
tions of engine function.
Thus the value of this explanation, and others like it, rests on an abstraction -
all details relating to heat transfer are excluded from the explanation. This abstrac-
tion results in a better explanation: the details pertaining to heat transfer would
greatly complicate the equations, and fail to give additional insight into the phe-
nomenon above. The abstraction depends on a distinction that is absolutely basic
to thermodynamics; that between work and heat.
How does this explanation relate to a statistical mechanical description? There
aren’t any obvious problems with reduction here (beyond perhaps some general
problems inherited from the incompleteness of the reduction of TD to SM); in
fact, there exists a strangely simple reductive account of γ that relates it to the
number of degrees of freedom in a given gas. Likewise, we do have something
like definitions of heat and work in terms of statistical mechanical variables; as
it happens, one way of getting a handle on the distinction in SM is via A, the
Helmholtz free energy.12 Recall our original thermodynamic equation for this:
ATD = U − TS. (16)
A here represents the amount of energy available for work, U is the internal energy
of the system, and TS (temperature × entropy) represents something like the
‘heat energy’ of the system (only something like the heat energy, because heat
only really makes sense as form of transferred energy). So our bridge law (13)
(or whatever other bridge law replaces it) gives an account of a quantity related
to work in statistical mechanical terms. Given that we also have expressions for
12The most direct way to think about the distinction between heat and work would be to take
a closer look at the first law of thermodynamics. However, our expression for the free energy is
intimately related to this, and we have already examined the form of the variable change involved.
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entropy in statistical mechanical terms, the prospects for reduction look good.
Let us also assume that there isn’t any problem in principle with describing
the ignition of a diesel engine in more fundamental terms, via either classical me-
chanics or quantum mechanics, and applying statistical mechanical techniques.
Doubtless such a description would be extremely complex, and very difficult to
achieve in practice! However, if we were to possess such a description, I’d be
happy enough to call it an explanation of the phenomenon. But it would certainly
not be the best explanation of diesel engine behaviour: our thermodynamic expla-
nation above seems to do a much better job.
Can we understand the value of this thermodynamic explanation from the per-
spective of statistical mechanics, even if we have both a reduction and a statistical
mechanical explanation? I think not. The simplest way in which we might under-
stand the explanatory value of the thermodynamic account from within statistical
mechanics would be if we could understand the thermodynamic description as
being a straightforward abstraction from the description proposed in more funda-
mental terms. However, this is exactly what the change to thermodynamic vari-
ables seems to block. By the lights of statistical mechanics, why should it lead to
better explanation to perform abstractions based on quantities related to the loga-
rithm of the partition function, or, worse, on the logarithm of the partition function
in the infinite limit? When we rewrite the explanation above in terms of statistical
mechanical variables, we can no longer see why we’ve thrown out some details,
and kept in others.
One way of thinking about the unnaturalness of the work/heat distinction from
the perspective of statistical mechanics is to think simply in terms of the kinetic
theory of gases. Here, the distinction between work and heat must be something
like the distinction between the kinetic energy associated with random, chaotic
motion of molecules, and the kinetic energy associated with aggregate motions of
molecules. Even if we can find some way of carving these up, it’s hard to see how
this could be a natural distinction; after all, from the perspective of the kinetic
theory, it’s all just kinetic energy.13
For this reason, it seems reasonable to say that the explanation offered by ther-
modynamics of diesel engine phenomena and the like is novel, in that its status as
a good explanation cannot be understood from the perspective of the description
given by the lower level theory. The abstraction involved in explanations involv-
ing adiabatic assumptions cuts across abstractions that might be natural from the
perspective of statistical mechanical variables. Even if we have a theoretical re-
13I owe this point to Wayne Myrvold (by way of his lecture notes).
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duction of the phenomenon, we can say that the thermodynamic explanation has
irreducible, and thus novel, explanatory value.
How does this shed light on the importance of asymptotic relationships? The
form of the bridge laws is highly relevant to the above conclusion. If the law
involved a simple relationship between statistical mechanical variables, then ab-
stractions based on the new variable might well look like helpful explanatory ab-
stractions by the light of statistical mechanics: only a little back-translation would
be required. It is precisely the complexity and mathematical irreversibility of a
bridge law like (13) that leads to the conclusion that the explanatory value of the
TD description is inexplicable from an statistical mechanical perspective. The fact
that (13) involves a very strong idealization and a resulting high degree of abstrac-
tion14 strengthens this point, and it’s precisely the use of the asymptotic limit that
establishes this idealization. Nonetheless, there’s no suggestion here that this kind
of explanatory novelty can only occur when an asymptotic limit occurs, nor that
it’s the only kind of novelty to be found in cases involving the asymptotic limit.
Batterman, for example, claims that the asymptotic analysis itself is explanatorily
novel.15 Again, I would be very happy to see multiple clear-cut accounts of nov-
elty in higher level theories, but the problem seems to me to be that clear accounts
of novelty are hard to find. The argument here, then, at least puts one such account
on the table.
5 Conclusions
I have presented two possibilities for accounting for the explanatory utility of
higher level descriptions:
1. Higher level descriptions acquire explanatory utility only because they suc-
cessfully abstract from a detailed, fundamental picture.
2. Higher level descriptions can sometimes be said to give novel explanations
in a way in which mere abstractions from an underlying picture cannot.
14It’s important to note here that abstraction has multiple roles to play in this story. The abstrac-
tion involved in taking the thermodynamic limit of the partition function count as an explanatory
abstraction within statistical mechanics. The cross cutting thermodynamic abstraction that intro-
duces explanatory novelty, on the other hand, is the abstraction based on the adiabatic assumption.
15Batterman makes this claim in his [6], when responding to criticisms from Gordon Belot [9].
However, it’s not quite clear what he means by novel in this context.
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An account that asserted (1) could nonetheless insist that higher level theories
had considerable explanatory power, but there would be no deep difference in the
kind of explanation they offered. Explanations given by TD, in so far as they
were successful, would be valuable for the same reasons that the idealized Z∞
is explanatorily valuable in SM. However, I have argued here that explanations
offered by a theory like thermodynamics can be thought of as novel in a robust
way; changes of variable induced by sufficiently complex bridge laws lead to new
standards of abstraction, and thus novel explanatory strategies.
Is this conclusion a matter of metaphysics, or of epistemology? Weak accounts
of emergence are often epistemic: they hold that emergence should be analysed as
novelty or irreducibility relative to some given theory or state of knowledge. Such
accounts are often contrasted with properly metaphysical emergence: this is the
kind of account of emergence that posits novel causal powers, or irreducible prop-
erties that do not depend on our epistemic state. Where does the current account
of explanatory novelty fit in this debate? One simple answer is that it fits badly.
Certainly, to some ears, our discussion of explanatory novelty will have an epis-
temic overtone. However, in one sense, my account here is weaker than standard
epistemic accounts of emergence; I argue here that a theory can possess novel
explanatory power even when a reduction is not just possible but epistemically
available! However, in another sense, my account of novelty is stronger than an
epistemic account. The fact that certain choices of variable facilitate explanatory
abstraction depends, I take it, on objective features of the world. The laws might
have been such that abstraction was much less helpful; that micro-scale details
might always have been important to phenomena. Equally, the laws might have
been such that simple abstraction from detail was all that was necessary in order to
capture the phenomena. But our world is not like that; it appears to be the kind of
world in which there are macro-variables that do an excellent job of predicting and
explaining phenomena despite being highly complex functions of micro-variables.
And in some cases, some complex function of the micro-variables turns out to be
irrelevant to the phenomenon at hand. Inasmuch as these features of the world are
an objective matter, the novelty proposed here is metaphysical.
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